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Abstract
The paper is a cross-country regression analysis estimating six
elasticities of economic variables with respect to the size of govern-
ment. The elasticity of the rate of inflation Is found to be positive,
high, and statistically significant. The elasticity of the participa-
tion rate is found to be slightly positive but not to differ signifi-
cantly from zero. The elasticity of hours per worker is found to be
slightly negative but not to differ significantly from zero. The
elasticity of overall labor supply is found to be minuscule and not
to differ significantly from zero. The elasticity of the gross saving
ratio is found to be negative, numerically high, and statistically
significant. So is the elasticity of the rate of growth.
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THE MIX OF THE MIXED ECONOMY—A CROSS-COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
By HANS BREMS*
The mix of the mixed economy has several dimensions each of which
displays considerable variation among 0ECD countries. At the one
extreme one usually finds Japan, at the other, Sweden.
The purpose of the present paper is to use such variation for a
cross-country analysis of the effects of the size of government. We
shall examine the effects upon inflation, participation rate, hours
per worker, overall labor supply, gross saving, and growth.
The following notation will be used.
E = total employment
e = government employment
F E labor force
g = rate of growth of real gross domestic product
i = rate of inflation
-2-
< ~ physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L = hours worked per week by labor force
P S population from 15 to 64
R 5 government current receipts
r = before-tax nominal rate of interest
p = after-tax real rate of interest
S s gross saving
T 5 tax rate
Y 5 gross domestic product
I. GOVERNMENT, LARGE AND SMALL
1 . Government as an Employer
For 1980-1986 the OECD (1988b: 38) reports government employment
as a percentage of total employment, e/E:
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Sweden 32.2
European Community 17.1
United States 16.2
Switzerland 11.0
Japan 6.6
The Swedish percentage is the highest and the Japanese one the
lowest among OECD countries. The cross-country range is very wide:
the Japanese percentage is a mere 20 percent of the Swedish one.
2 . Government as a Redistributor
For 1980-1986 the OECD (1988b: 63) reports social-security
transfers as a percentage of gross domestic product:
Sweden 18.3
European Community 18.2
Switzerland 13.3
United States 11 .3
Japan 10.9
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Here the Swedish percentage is not the highest among OECD coun-
tries and the Japanese one not the lowest. Between them the cross-
country range is moderate: the Japanese percentage is 60 percent of
the Swedish one.
3. Government as a Final Consumer
For 1980-1986 the OECD (1988b: 62) reports government final
consumption as a percentage of gross domestic product:
Sweden 28.3
European Community 18.9
United States 18.1
Switzerland 13.1
Japan 9.9
The Swedish percentage is the highest and the Japanese one the
lowest among OECD countries. The cross-country range is now wider:
the Japanese percentage is merely 35 percent of the Swedish one.
-5-
4
.
Government as a Tax Collector
Government transfers, subsidies, interest payments, final consump-
tion, and gross capital formation must be financed. For 1980-1986
the OECD (1988b: 64) reports government receipts as a percentage of
gross domestic product, R/Y:
Sweden 59.2
European Community 43.2
Switzerland 33.9
United States 31.1
Japan 29.8
The Swedish percentage is the highest and the Japanese one the
lowest among OECD countries. The Japanese percentage is 50 percent of
the Swedish one.
5
.
Cross-Country Regressions
Such wide variation tempts us to use cross-country regression
analysis to illuminate the effects of the size of government, and we
shall find it convenient to use regressions of the constant-elasticity
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type: let a dependent variable y be a function of an independent
variable x, and let the function be linear in its logarithms:
logy = loga + blogx (1)
where a and b are its parameters. The function itself
y = ax (2)
will then have the constant elasticity dlogy/dlogx = b and appear as
a straight line when drawn on double-logarithmic paper. Its elas-
ticity b will conveniently appear as the steepness of that line.
Our regressions will use a small sample of ten advanced North
American, Northwestern European, and Pacific-rim countries, i.e.,
Australia (A), Canada (CND), Denmark (DK) , France (F), Germany (D)
,
Japan (J), Sweden (S), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), and the
United States (US). Data used are found in tables I-III in our
appendix.
Let us begin with the effect of size of government upon rate of
inflation.
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II. GOVERNMENT AND INFLATION
1
.
Figure 1
Regress the two columns of table I and find the elasticity 0.745
of the rate of inflation i with respect to government employment e/E
to be clearly positive and to be a full 4.35 times its own standard
error hence to differ from zero at a one percent level of significance
This particular regression is our most successful one, and we may
safely conclude that a higher rate of inflation will go with higher
government employment. Why should it?
2
.
Interpretation
Private industry produces for a market, often an international
market with price-elastic demand. Private industry can go bankrupt
and will after a protracted profits squeeze not relieved by devalua-
tion.
Government does not produce for a market but produces public goods
and is required by law to deliver them. Government cannot go bank-
rupt but can always tax and borrow. As a result government resistance
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to wage demands can be expected to be weaker than the resistance of
private industry.
Swedish experience is illuminating. Swedish civil servants won
the right to strike in the seventies and in the eighties became
increasingly militant. Until 1975 industry traditionally opened
collective bargaining. But after 1975 the rapidly growing public
sector has increasingly assumed the role of a wage leader.
We shall understand the role of government as a wage leader even
better when we look at wage differentials within government: govern-
ment wage differentials are traditionally narrower than private ones.
At the top end of the scale the highest-paid government employees are
paid less than the highest-paid private ones. As a result government
finds it difficult to keep its best computer experts, tax experts,
professors, or airforce pilots. At the opposite end of the scale the
lowest-paid government employees are paid more than the lowest-paid
private ones. The private sector finds it difficult to keep its
skilled blue-collar workers, and wage drift results.
All this leads us to expect high government employment to make an
economy more inflation-prone.
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III. TAX AND LABOR SUPPLY
1
.
Tax Burden
Let income recipients harbor neither money nor tax illusions, then
what matters for their supply of labor will be after-tax real income.
A flat direct tax rate of T percent will reduce such income by
reducing money income by T percent at unchanged prices. A flat
indirect tax rate of T percent will reduce it by raising all prices
by T percent at unchanged money income.
With indirect taxes included the overall tax rate displays less
progression, if any, than does the direct tax rate. International
data on progression are not readily available. So as a first approxi-
mation let us ignore progression altogether and define our tax burden
simply as government receipts in percent of gross domestic product,
R/Y. Will such a tax burden affect labor supply?
2. Dimensions of Labor Supply
Labor supply has two dimensions: how large a fraction of the
population is working and for how long? In our notation the first
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dimension is the participation rate F/P. The second dimension is
hours per week per worker L/F. Overall labor supply is their product,
hours per week per head:
(F/PKL/F) = L/P (3)
3
.
Figure 2: First Dimension of Labor Supply
Regress first and fourth columns of table II and find the elas-
ticity 0.116 of the participation rate F/P with respect to the tax
burden R/Y to be slightly positive but to be a mere 1.17 times its
own standard error hence not to differ from zero at a ten percent
level of significance.
4. Interpretation
Let income and leisure be substitutes. At a high tax rate another
breadwinner adds less after-tax income and may not be worth the while:
the substitution effect upon the participation rate is negative. But
at a high tax rate the household can also afford less of everything
and may try to keep up after-tax income by adding another breadwinner:
the income effect upon the participation rate is positive. The
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substitution effect and the income effect pull In opposite directions
Their balance may be small and precarious and go either way. In
figure 2 it is small and goes positive: the income effect is winning-
a finding not inconsistent with conventional findings on the labor
supply of wives as summarized by Aron and Pechman (1981: 2) or
Bosworth (1984: 142-143).
5 . Figure 3: Second Dimension of Labor Supply
We must now turn to the second dimension of labor supply, and
here we encounter a difficulty. No data on hours are known to the
writer except those published by the International Labour Office.
ILO data are less uniform than OECD data: some refer to hours paid
for, others to hours actually worked. For nine countries the data
refer to all nonagricultural activities but for Denmark merely to
manufacturing. We must use the data as they come.
Regress second and fourth columns of table II and find the elas-
ticity -0.0778 of hours per week per worker L/F with respect to the
tax burden R/Y to be very slightly negative but to be a mere -0.516
times its own standard error hence not to differ from zero at a ten
percent level of significance.
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6. Interpretation
Again let income and leisure be substitutes. At a high tax rate
another hour of work adds less after-tax income and may not be worth
the while: the substitution effect upon hours worked is negative.
But at a high tax rate the household can also afford less of every-
thing and may try to keep up after-tax income by adding another hour
of work: the income effect upon hours worked is positive. The sub-
stitution effect and the income effect pull in opposite directions.
Their balance may be small and precarious and go either way. In
figure 3 it is small and goes negative: the substitution effect is
winning— a finding not inconsistent with findings on the labor supply
of males by Hausman (1981) and Fullerton (1982).
7
.
Figure 4: Overall Labor Supply
Regress third and fourth columns of table II and find the elas-
ticity 0.0376 of hours per week per head 15 to 64, L/P, with respect
to the tax burden R./Y to be minuscule and be a minuscule 0.272 times
its own standard error hence not to differ from zero at a ten percent
level of significance. In English: we certainly cannot reject the
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hypothesis that the tax burden has no effect upon overall labor
supply.
This is not surprising. The balances of figures 2 and 3 were
small and precarious balances between a substitution effect and an
income effect. They could go either way and did: they were positive
and negative, respectively. Now because of equation (3) the balance
of figure 4 is itself a balance between the balances of figures 2 and
3
—hence even smaller and even more precarious.
IV. TAX AND SAVING
1 . Figure 5
Regress first and third columns of table III and find the elas-
ticity -0.607 of gross saving S/Y with respect to the tax burden R/Y
to be clearly negative and to be a respectable -2.17 times its own
standard error hence to differ from zero at a six percent level of
significance. We conclude that a lower gross saving ratio will go
with a higher tax burden. Why should it?
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2 . Interpretation: Macroeconomics
On the macroeconomics of saving and taxes early writers as dif-
ferent as Sir James Steuart (1767) and Adam Smith (1776) agreed. The
former wrote:
...Taxes draw money into circulation... It is no
objection to this representation of the matter, that the
persons from whom the money is taken, would have spent it as
well as the state. The answer is, that it might be so, or
not: whereas when the state gets it, it will be spent
undoubtedly.
Adam Smith wrote succinctly: "[Kings and ministers] are them-
selves always, and without exception, the greatest spendthrifts in the
society." Do such eighteenth-century observations apply to modern
welfare states?
To begin with, not only may modern governments fail to save; they
typically dissave: as reported by OECD (1988b: 64) for 1980-1986
all the governments of our ten countries except the Swiss one had
outlays in excess of their receipts.
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As we know [Modigliani (1988: 16)], the simple fact that factor
income dries up with retirement constitutes an important, perhaps the
most important, incentive to saving. Social security removes that
incentive, thus reducing private saving. Does it replace the lost
private saving by government saving? As Feldstein (1974) pointed out,
the answer depends on how social security is financed.
The actuarial principle would require social-security contribu-
tions to be paid into a fund placed in interest-earning assets. Upon
retirement a participant would be receiving an annuity whose size
would depend upon the size of his past contributions and the interest
earned on them. Like the voluntary contributions of a private insur-
ance scheme the mandatory contributions of a government scheme would
be saved: government saving would indeed replace the lost private
saving.
It would remain true, as often observed, that current annuities
are taken from current output. But current output is a function of
current labor and current accumulated capital stock. Whether accumu-
lated as the result of government or private saving, the accumulating
fund would be invested in an accumulating physical capital stock
giving the economy a larger current output than would have been pos-
sible without the fund.
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By contrast the pay-as-you-go principle requires social-security
contributions to be collected in the form of a tax instantly spent on
annuities in the form of transfer payments. No accumulating fund
would be invested in an accumulating physical capital stock. No
government saving would replace the lost private saving. Kotlikoff
(1987: 415) estimates capital stock to be 20 to 30 percent less under
pay-as-you-go social-security schemes on the scale common in advanced
economies of the 1980s.
At their origins in 1889 and 1935, respectively, both German and
U.S. social-security legislation embraced the actuarial principle but
dropped it in 1957 and 1939, respectively, in favor of the pay-as-you-go
principle. Sizeable funding of social security is found in Japan,
Sweden, and Switzerland—all three lying above the regression line of
figure 5.
3 . Interpretation: Microeconomics
Consider a lender and a borrower in a capital market in which
money may be placed and borrowed at the before-tax nominal rate of
interest r. Let the rate of inflation be i and the tax rate T. The
after-tax real rate of interest is then defined:
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p i (1 - T)r - i (4)
Equation (4) is the after-tax real return on his capital facing
a saver as a lender: his nominal interest return is taxable, and the
real value of his asset is being eroded by inflation. Let a saver
harbor neither money nor tax illusions, then his supply of saving will
be a function solely of (4). Here a higher tax rate T will reduce
(1 - T), and (4) can stay the same only as long as the bef ore-tax
nominal rate of interest r is in inverse proportion to (1 - T). For
example, at an inflation rate i = 0.07 the after-tax real rate of
interest can stay the same at, say, p = 0.05 only if at tax rates
T = 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 the before-tax nominal rate r were 0.15, 0.20,
and 0.30, respectively, and indeed would be rising without bounds for
T approaching one—the Feldstein (1976) effect. Can borrowers afford
such rates? We turn to a borrower.
Let a firm be producing a single good from labor and a physical
capital stock of that good. Let < be the physical marginal produc-
tivity of that capital stock. The firm will keep borrowing until
after-tax physical marginal productivity equals after-tax real rate of
interest:
(1 - T)k = p = (1 - T)r - i (5)
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The right-hand side of (5) is equation (4) now representing the
after-tax real cost of its capital facing the firm as a borrower: its
nominal interest cost is tax-deductible, and the real value of its
liability is being eroded by inflation. Can (4) stay the same if the
tax rate is up?
Figure 6 shows the demand for borrowing and the supply of lending.
A tax rate up from T. to T„ depresses the after-tax physical marginal
productivity from the solid to the broken curve: the firm can no
longer afford the original (4). Equilibrium moves from A to B:
investment, saving, and the after-tax real rate of interest p are down
all three of them.
V. TAX AND GROWTH
1 . Figure 7
Regress second and third columns of table 111 and find the elas-
ticity -0.872 of the rate of growth g with respect to the tax burden
R/Y to be clearly negative and to be a respectable -2.37 t imes its
own standard error hence to differ from zero at a five percent level
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of significance. We may safely conclude that a lower rate of growth
will go with a higher tax burden. Why should it?
2 . Interpretation
Some of our earlier findings may help us interpret figure 7.
International competitiveness implies a low rate of inflation and
is one prerequisite for a high rate of growth. If, as in figure 1, a
higher rate of inflation will go with higher government employment so
will, in figure 7, a lower rate of growth.
Technological progress is the dominant source of growth. In
early neoclassical growth models [Solow (1956)] technological progress
fell like manna from heaven and was disembodied. In the real world,
before technological progress can make its way into actual production
it must, first, itself be produced. The research and development
producing it takes time. Such research and development is one part
of gross investment financed by gross savings. Second, once produced
such technological progress must be embodied into new producers' goods
physically different from those replaced. Such embodiment and replace-
ment is another part of gross investment financed by gross saving.
In short, a high gross saving ratio is another prerequisite for a
high rate of growth. If, as in figure 5, a lower gross saving ratio
-20-
will go with a higher tax burden so will, in figure 7, a lower rate
of growth.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The wide variation of the mix of the mixed economy among OECD
countries has enabled us to do a cross-country regression analysis
estimating six elasticities of economic variables with respect to the
size of government. The elasticity of the rate of inflation was found
to be positive, high, and statistically significant. The elasticity
of the participation rate was found to be slightly positive but not
to differ significantly from zero. The elasticity of hours per worker
was found to be slightly negative but not to differ significantly from
zero. The elasticity of overall labor supply was found to be
minuscule and not to differ significantly from zero. The elasticity
of the gross saving ratio was found to be negative, numerically high,
and statistically significant. So was the elasticity of the rate of
growth.
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The ten OECD countries constituting our sample were all advanced
capitalist economies to which standard economic theory ought to apply.
The signs, sizes, and statistical significance, or lack of it, of our
six cross-country elasticities were inconsistent neither with standard
economic theory nor with empirical findings using domestic United
States data.
We have made no attempt to estimate effects, however important, of
2
the public goods and transfers financed by government receipts. We
3have made no attempt to estimate effects, not directly observable,
upon an underground economy.
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FOOTNOTES
*The author is professor of economics at the University of
Illinois and is indebted to Rene Frey of Basel for advice. The author has
benefited from discussions with Rolf G. H. Henriksson and Lars Werin
of Stockholm, Lars Magnusson of Uppsala, Bo Sandelin of Gothenburg,
and Walt McMahon of Illinois. For computational assistance the author
is indebted to Murray Simpson, graduate student at the University of
Illinois.
A rigorous derivation of this familiar result is found in Brems
(1983: 96-97).
2
Lindbeck (1983) offered an extensive study of Swedish redistri-
bution.
3
Such effects may be indirectly observable: Frey-Weck (1983),
(1984) observed the increase between 1960 and 1978 of determinants
and symptoms of an underground economy and ranked 17 OECD countries
according to such increase. Sweden was always at or near the top,
Japan or Switzerland at or near the bottom of the list.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
TEN COUNTRIES, 1979 OR 1980 TO 1986
i e/E
Australia 8.7 26.3
Canada 7.3 19.
6
a
Denmark 7.9 29.9
France 9.1 16.9
Germany 3.5 15.7
Japan 3.1 6.6 b
Sweden 9.0 32.2
Switzerland 3.7 11.0
United Kingdom 8.1 21.9
United States 6.1 16.2
a 1980-1984.
b 1980-1985.
Sources: OECD (1988b: 38 and 83).
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TABLE II
LABOR SUPPLY AND TAX BURDEN, TEN COUNTRIES, 1986
F/P L/Fa L/P a R/Y
Australia
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Japan
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States: hours
paid for. Other countries: hours actually worked. Denmark:
manufacturing. Other countries: nonagricultural activities.
b
1985
Sources: OECD (1988b: 34 and 64). ILO (1987: 669-673).
0.72 34.6 24.9 33.
5
b
0.74 32.3 23.9 39.2
0.83 33.0 27.4 58.0
0.66 38.9 25.7 48. b
0.66 40.5 26.7 44.7
0.72 40.4 29.1 31.3
0.81 36.2 29.3 61.5
0.72 43.0 31.0 35.0
0.75 42.7 32.0 41.9
0.75 34.8 26.1 31.3
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TABLE III
GROSS SAVING, RATE OF GROWTH, AND TAX BURDEN
TEN COUNTRIES, 1979 OR 1980 TO 1986
S/Y g R/Y
Australia 19.5 2.7 32.
5
a
Canada 20.1 2.7 38.4
Denmark 14.1 2.2 54.2
France 20.2 1.6 47.
3
a
Germany 21.5 1.4 45.1
Japan 31.0 3.8 29.8
Sweden 16.9 1.7 59.2
Switzerland 28.7 2.0 33.9
United Kingdom 18.4 1.4 42.3
United States 17.1 2.4 31.1
a1980-1985.
Sources: OECD (1988b: 44, 64 , and 70).
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